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Perceiving a visual object requires binding sensory estimates of its various physical attributes. This process can be
facilitated if changes of different attributes are perceived with little asynchronies when they are physically aligned, which is
not always the case as revealed by temporal order judgment or perceptual synchronization tasks of visual attributes
changes. In this study, we analyzed the effect of performing a motor action on the perceived relative timing between
changes of position and color of a visual target by using a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task. Results showed that in the
perceptual condition, the change of color must precede (37.9 ms) the change of position in order to perceive a
synchronous change of both target’s visual attributes. This physical asynchrony vanished when the same changes took
place near the end of a manual reaching action executed towards the visual target (3.3 ms). The reduction of asynchrony
was, however, not observed when participants performed TOJ of visual attributes change in the presence of concomitant
tactile information (36 ms) but with no action. The perceptual relative timing between visual changes was also unaffected
when the timing was obtained by comparing each visual change to tactile information resulting from motor action (33.5 ms)
or external stimulation (27.8 ms). Altogether, these results suggest that signals associated with the organization of a motor
action, but not sensory information itself, contribute to reduce the differential delays when processing visual attributes of a
single object. Furthermore, the effect of action was not observed when judging relative timing of object-related (visual)
versus object-unrelated (tactile) sensory information.
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Introduction
Maintaining a unitary percept of a visual object,
despite the constant variation of its characteristics
(position, color, shape) over time, requires continuous-
ly binding the various sensory estimates of its physical
attributes. We know that different parts of the brain
process different aspects of sensory information,
though we still have a unitary conscious experience of
external stimuli. Concerning the visual system, the
dominant view is that there is a sharp division of labor
between a visuo-motor system processing visual infor-
mation through the dorsal pathway from the primary
visual cortex (V1) to the posterior parietal cortex and a
visuo-semantic system processing visual information
through the ventral pathway from the primary visual
cortex (V1) to the inferotemporal cortex (Milner &
Goodale, 1995, 2008). Accordingly, components of
sensory processing are considered as being dependent
on behavioral purpose. Within this theoretical frame-
work, action-related parameters such as size, location,
and orientation are thought to be processed through
the dorsal stream of the visual system (e.g., Pisella et
al., 2009), whereas perceptual aspects for object
identiﬁcation such as shape, color, texture, and weight
are thought to be processed through the ventral stream
of the visual system (e.g., Op de Beeck, Haushofer, &
Kanwisher, 2008). However, latencies in processing
sensory information within the visual system are lower
within the dorsal stream (around 40–80 ms within
parietal areas) than within the ventral stream (around
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100–150 ms within temporal areas, Tanne´, Boussaoud,
Boyer-Zeller, & Rouiller, 1995) depending mainly on
whether cortical areas are activated by heavily myelin-
ated, fast conducting magnocellular ﬁbers or parvocel-
lular ﬁbers characterized by slower transfer of
information (Nowak & Bullier, 1997). In agreement
with these differential neural delays, psychophysical
experiments have shown that the perception of stimuli
changes is dependent on the estimated attributes. For
instance, reaction times in a location discrimination
task were reported to be within the range of 350–450
ms (Rossetti, Koga, & Mano, 1993; Tanaka &
Shimojo, 1996), whereas reaction times to discriminate
stimuli on the basis of semantic information were found
to be within the range of 400–650 ms (Bartolo,
Weisbecker, & Coello, 2007; Sereno & Rayner, 2003).
In the same vein, Pisella, Arzi, and Rossetti (1998)
showed that color information is processed about 80
ms slower than position information in a task where
participants were instructed to interrupt their motor
action when the target changed location or color.
The direction of the perceived asynchrony does not
always conform to the neurophysiological data. When
pairing direction of motion with color many studies
have found a color-motion asynchrony (CMA) in
which color leads motion (e.g., Linares & Lo´pez-
Moliner, 2006; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Nishida &
Johnston, 2002; Viviani & Aymoz, 2001). However, an
explanation of the illusion invoking an extra delay for
processing the direction of motion has been proposed
by some authors (Arnold, Clifford, & Wenderoth,
2001; Bedell, Chung, Ogmen, & Patel, 2003; Moutous-
sis & Zeki, 1997). Furthermore, the CMA has been
shown to be task-dependent (e.g., whether color change
occurred simultaneous or after motion onset, Gauch &
Kerzel, 2008; see also Linares & Lo´pez-Moliner, 2006;
Nishida & Johnston, 2002) and these temporal
variations in processing visual attributes might be
related to the paradigms used (e.g., reaction time
versus temporal order judgment, see Cardoso-Leite,
Gorea, & Mamassian, 2007 for a discussion) or stimuli
characteristics (e.g., stimuli saliency, Adams & Ma-
massian, 2004; Miller & Schwarz, 2006).
Beside the discussion about the causal role of
differential delays in the explanation of the CMA or
related asynchronies, the parallel processing of separate
attributes naturally raises the issue of their integration,
i.e., how the independent attributes are bound together
through an active process providing a unitary percept of
visual objects (von der Malsburg, 1995; Roskies, 1999;
Schmidt, 2009; Treisman, 1999). Several mechanisms
have been proposed to account for sensory binding,
focusing either on neural synchronization or temporal
constraint associated with cognitive functions. At the
neuronal level, integration could emerge from the
temporal synchronization of neural activities that, in
different networks, signal the processing of different
attributes of the same event (Ko¨nig & Engel, 1995;
Singer & Gray, 1995; von der Malsburg, 1995) using
neural oscillations as binding mechanism (Engel &
Singer, 2001). Another possibility would be to use
conjunctive neural representations involving persistent
patterns of weight strengths between neural units, so
that different neural units are activated for different
combinations of input features (O’Reilly, Busby, & Soto,
2003). At the functional level, theories have mainly
focused on memory (Fougnie & Marois, 2009; Keizer,
Colzato, & Hommel, 2008), attention (Kahneman,
Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Treisman & Gelade, 1980)
mechanisms, or time perception (Wenke & Haggard,
2009) to account for sensory or features binding.
Despite the existence of different theoretical frame-
works, the common idea is that attributes of the
relevant events in the visual scene depend on a speciﬁc,
though context dependent, time register before reach-
ing consciousness (Aymoz & Viviani, 2004). By
contrasting passive and active conditions, other authors
have suggested that endogenous activity may also
contribute to sensory binding. Haggard, Clark, and
Kalogeras (2002), for instance, showed that performing
a voluntary action inﬂuences the temporal perception
of sensory events associated with that action. In their
study, the perception of a sound was shifted 46 ms
earlier in time relative to a baseline condition when it
was preceded by a voluntary motor action. Interpreted
within the framework of intentional binding by the
authors, this effect underlines a contribution of
‘‘predictive models of motor control in constructing
conscious experience of action.’’ Indeed, voluntary
actions imply predictive mechanisms which are used
to anticipate expected sensory consequences of acting,
evaluate action feasibility (Jeannerod, 2006), and also
guide actual motor behavior (Wolpert, Ghahramani, &
Jordan, 1995). These predictive mechanisms are
thought to inﬂuence the temporal perception of sensory
and motor events (Haggard et al., 2002; Stetson, Cui,
Montague, & Eagleman, 2006; Wenke & Haggard,
2009). Consequently, the perception of different object
attributes is also expected to be inﬂuenced by whether
or not these attributes vary in relation to voluntary
motor action, particularly when they are processed with
different latencies (Nowak & Bullier, 1997). In agree-
ment with this, previous studies have shown that the
temporal constraints associated with object color and
position processing are affected by the observational
context. For instance, Aymoz and Viviani (2004)
showed that when embedding visual changes into an
observed biological movement, the perception of object
displacement did not lag the perception of color change
as it is usually found in perceptual tasks. Thus, in the
action condition the perceived temporal synchroniza-
tion of attribute changes may not exclusively result
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from relative time delays associated with the neural
organization of the visual system (Nowak & Bullier,
1997) or perceptual anticipation due to prediction of
the visual event since the reduction of temporal
asynchrony was not observed when the object displace-
ment resulted from the impact of a nonbiological
stimulus (Aymoz & Viviani, 2004). The authors’
interpretation of this effect was that the moving hand
calls into play the interaction between the visual and
the motor system. It is indeed acknowledged that
observed human actions are usually interpreted within
a neural network similar to the one used for planning
and executing actual motor actions (Grezes, Costes, &
Decety, 1998). Generating a reliable representation of a
human action may then provide an access to predicted
sensory consequences of acting, and thus may contrib-
ute to the binding mechanism whereby all attributes of
the relevant events in the visual scene are set into strict
time register before reaching consciousness (Moore &
Haggard, 2008). As a consequence of predictive motor
mechanisms, the neural timing mechanism could be
modulated during the action execution period in order
to facilitate the processing and integration of action-
related sensory signals (Wenke & Haggard, 2009). In
case of variable delays in sensory and motor pathways,
the temporal relationship between action and sensa-
tions is thought to be recalibrated to overcome
changing latencies and to restore both the perception
of object unity (Yarrow, Haggard, Heal, Brown, &
Rothwell, 2001) and perceived events causality (Stetson
et al., 2006) or agency (Haggard et al., 2002).
However, the effect of an actual motor action on the
perceived differential delays between changes of differ-
ent sensory attributes has never been tested and this
represents the aim of the present study. We initially
used a temporal order judgment task of changes of
color and position attributes of a visual target in a
manual reaching task. As mentioned above, there is
some consensus that in the context of action, percep-
tion of visual events obeys some principle of temporal
predictability. In real life, our actions and the following
expected sensory consequences are already calibrated
so that we perceive this sequence without any
conspicuous delay despite the neural delays inherent
in the nervous system. For example, the retinal ﬂow
while moving our head or the visual detection of the
effects of our hand actions are perceived without any
apparent delay. Then, we tested in Experiment 1
whether the physical asynchrony between color and
position changes expected in a perceptual condition
was reduced when articulating the same changes with a
motor action due to prediction mechanisms. However,
reaching tasks imply also tactile information around
the movement end-point which is known to contribute
to the spatio-temporal aspects of sensorimotor perfor-
mances. Indeed, signals from tactile receptors partici-
pate in encoding the position sense of the ﬁngers
(Gentilucci, Toni, Daprati, & Gangitano, 1997; Gor-
don & Soechting, 1995; Rabin & Gordon, 2004) and
contribute to the timing control in sensorimotor
synchronization tasks (Aschersleben, 2002; Billon,
Semjen, Cole, & Gauthier, 1996; Stenneken, 2006).
Furthermore, tactile information was found to be as
accurate as the other sensory information (visual or
auditory) in temporal order judgment (TOJ) tasks
(Gallace & Spence, 2008; Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961).
Then, to show that action-related information (inter-
nally predicted) and not subsequent tactile information
is crucial for reducing perceptual asynchrony of visual
attribute changes, we also tested whether the mere
presence of tactile information without performing any
action (not internally predicted) inﬂuences the per-
ceived differential delays between color and position
changes. Finally, cross-modal information can be
affected differently by voluntary action. Tactile infor-
mation, for instance, does not always vary congruently
with visual information depending on object (soft or
rigid) or action (touching, grasping, pulling, etc.)
properties and is subjected to sensory attenuation
effect when contingent to intentional motor produc-
tions (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999). We then
tested in Experiment 2 whether the effect of voluntary
action on sensory processing is still preserved when
comparing cross-modal information (i.e., visual and
tactile information) in a TOJ task involving or not
intentional action.
Experiment 1: Effect of motor
action on perceived relative
timing between position and
color information
This experiment was designed to test the effect of
performing an intentional action on the temporal order
judgments of changes of position and color attributes
of a visual target (motor condition) compared to a
passive condition where no action was performed and
the participant received (tactile condition) or not
(perceptual condition) a tactile stimulation on the
foreﬁnger around the time position and color attributes
of the visual target changed.
Method
Participants
Ten participants (six females) aged between 21 and
32 years (mean age: 25.8 years 6 3.4 years) participated
in the two experiments. None of them reported any
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sensory or motor deﬁcits and all had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. They were recruited as
volunteers and all were naı¨ve to the purpose of the
experiment (except for one participant who was one of
the authors). Participants gave their informed agree-
ment and were volunteers to take part to the
experiment, which was performed in agreement with
the local ethical committee guidelines and in accor-
dance with the declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and apparatus
Participants sat in a dimly lighted room in front of a
22-in CRT computer screen (Mitsubishi Diamond Pro
2070 SB, spatial resolution: 1024· 768 pixels, sampling
rate: 100 Hz) at a viewing distance of 30 cm. A response
box was positioned on the table close to the body so
that the participant could easily provide a response by
pressing one of the two buttons. Custom software using
Delphi routines was used to control the sequence of
displayed images and to record the position of an
ultrasonic marker for which the (x, y, z) coordinates
were provided by a ZEBRIS 3D recording system
(Zebris Medical GmbH, Isny, temporal resolution: 100
Hz, spatial resolution: 0.5 mm). The ultrasonic marker
was placed on the participant’s right foreﬁnger and was
used to trigger the trial and to change the image on the
computer screen depending on its location in space.
Each image contained on the lower part of the screen a
starting location for the right foreﬁnger (white circle,
diameter: 0.5 cm) and a target on the upper part of the
screen (red circle, diameter: 1 cm) distant by 24 cm.
During the trial, the color and position of the target
changed according to a predeﬁned temporal sequence
(perceptual condition), according to the position of the
right foreﬁnger during action (motor condition), or,
ﬁnally, according to the time a tactile stimulus was
delivered to the participant’s foreﬁnger (tactile condi-
tion, see below). Position change corresponded to a
sudden 1 cm displacement of the target upwards. Color
change corresponded to a sudden change from red
(International Commission on Illumination-CIE x:
0.413, y: 0.213, z: 0.019) to green (CIE x: 0.358, y:
0.715, z: 0.119). The stimuli were isoluminant (18.8 cd/
m2).
In the tactile condition, the experimental setup was
similar to the one described above for the perceptual
and motor conditions except that instead of being
initially positioned at the bottom of the computer
screen, the participant’s foreﬁnger was positioned at the
center of a computer loudspeaker (diameter 3.5 cm,
frequency: 100 Hz, period: 5 ms) placed just beside
target location on the computer screen. Without
applying any particular pressure on the loudspeaker’s
membrane, tactile stimulation was provided by the
deformation of the speaker membrane in response to a
single electrical signal sent by the computer. In order to
remove any auditory signal due to the activation of the
loudspeaker, participants wore hearing protectors. A
pre-experiment test revealed that while wearing hearing
protectors, the snapping sound coming from the
loudspeaker was not detected by the participant.
Procedure
The task for the participants was to perform
temporal order judgments in three conditions: a
perceptual, a motor, and a tactile condition. In the
perceptual and motor conditions, the participant
positioned their right foreﬁnger at the starting location
on the screen and an auditory tone was provided
between 500 and 1000 ms after the right foreﬁnger
reached the starting location, indicating the beginning
of the trial. In the perceptual condition, the reference
target attribute (position or color, in block sessions)
changed following a delay of 700 ms after the tone. In
the motor condition, following the tone the participants
had to manually reach the target in about 700 ms
(participants were familiarized with this movement
duration before the experiment) and the reference
target attribute (position or color) change occurred
100 ms before or after ﬁnger-target contact. We did so
in order to avoid any interference of a concomitant
tactile event with the reference visual change.
In the tactile condition, the task for the participants
was to perform temporal order judgments between
color and position attributes changes of a visual target
while receiving a concurrent tactile stimulation (see
Figure 1). The participant positioned their right
foreﬁnger at the center of the loudspeaker fastened on
the computer screen. In each trial, the beginning of the
trial corresponded to the appearance of the target on
the screen and the tactile stimulation was provided
following a delay of 700 ms. The reference target
attribute change (position or color) occurred 100 ms
before or after the tactile stimulation.
In all conditions, a test target attribute (color or
position) change occurred from200 ms up to 200 ms
relative to the reference change, by steps of 50 ms
(resulting in nine possible stimuli onset asynchony,
SOA). The occurrence of the test target attribute
change was selected according to a pseudorandom
order, with each SOA value being presented 10 times.
The task for the participants was to indicate which
attribute (position or color) changed ﬁrst using one of
the two buttons of the response box (two-alternative
forced choice [AFC] paradigm). In the perceptual
condition, participants performed 180 trials, Reference
Target Attribute (position or color) · SOA (200;
150;100;50; 0; 50; 100; 150; 200 ms) · 10 Trials).
In the motor and tactile conditions, participants
performed 360 trials, Reference Target Attributes
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(position or color) · Time for Change of Reference
Target Attribute (6100 ms according to the occurrence
of tactile information) · SOA (200;150;100;50;
0; 50; 100; 150; 200 ms) · 10 Trials. The task for the
participants was to indicate which attribute (position or
color) changed ﬁrst using one of the two buttons of the
response box (two-AFC paradigm) while ignoring the
tactile stimulation.
In all conditions, the participant had to respond as
quickly and precisely as possible. To estimate the
negative SOA in the condition involving a motor
action, we derived the temporal value from the spatial
location of the ultrasound marker computed online.
These spatial locations were estimated from a pilot
study, which revealed that spatial coordinates on
average corresponding to 300 ms, 250 ms, 200
ms,150 ms,100 ms, and50 ms were, respectively,
80 mm, 70 mm, 60 mm, 45 mm, 30 mm, and 15 mm
from the target location along the vertical z axis of the
computer screen. Assuming that movements were
executed in about 700 ms, expected average negative
SOA between change of test target attribute and ﬁnger
contact was 150 ms and 50 ms, respectively, when
the change of referent target attribute was ﬁxed at
either 100 ms (SOA: 300, 250, 200, 150, 100,
50, 0 ms) or 100 ms (SOA: 100, 50, 0, ms).
Postexperiment analysis revealed that averaged SOA
before ﬁnger contact was129.9 ms (SD: 36.6 ms) and
58.8.6 ms (SD: 16.7 ms), respectively, when the
change of the referent target attribute was ﬁxed at
100 ms and 100 ms, these two values being not
statistically different from the expected values, t(9) ¼
1.66, p ¼ 0.13 and t(9)¼ 1.76, p ¼ 0.11.
Data analysis
In each condition, the set of data for each participant
was the distribution of the proportion of trials in which
the test change was perceived later than the reference
change. Depending on the session, the reference
attribute could be either position or color. For the
Figure 1. Time sequence of reference attribute (color or position) and test attribute (color or position) change in the perceptual, motor, and
tactile conditions. The change of test attribute could occur within the time window of 6200 ms according to the occurrence of the
reference attribute change. In the motor condition (middle panel), reference attribute change occurred at 6100 ms according to the
movement end-point and for the tactile condition (lower panel), reference attribute change occurred at 6100 ms according to tactile
stimulation.
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sake of simplifying the graphical presentation, we
normalized the responses and used position change as
a reference (position change ¼ zero). We thus plotted
the proportion of time in which position was perceived
as changing before color irrespective of the time-locked
attribute. We applied this procedure to the perceptual,
motor, and tactile conditions. In addition to this, we
analyzed separately the two distributions coming from
the two different locked attributes in order to compare
them. Data were pooled over participants and the
parameters (mean and standard deviation) of a
cumulative Gaussian were estimated using maximum
likelihood procedure. The point of subjective simulta-
neity (PSS) corresponded to the mean of the distribu-
tion, which served as a measure of the perceptual
asynchrony between color and position change. If the
changes were perceived synchronously when presented
at the same time, the distribution would be centered on
the value zero. In the three conditions, a positive PSS
value (curve shifted to the right) denoted that position
change must occur before color change for perceiving
the two changes in synchrony (i.e., processing of
position lagging processing of color) and a negative
PSS value would imply the opposite. The standard
deviation of the data estimated from the cumulative
Gaussian (SD) expressed the sensitivity of the percep-
tual system, with a higher standard deviation indicating
more variable perceptual judgments. We used para-
metric bootstrap method (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993) to
obtain the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the two
parameters of the cumulative Gaussian functions after
running 2000 simulations. By running simulations, we
take into account the nonuniform sampling of data
points to estimate the variability of the parameters of
the ﬁtted curve. This is important because data points
are not equally spaced before and after the ﬁnger has
touched the screen.
Results
Temporal order judgment of color and position change
in the perceptual condition
When comparing color change and position change
in a temporal order judgment task, we found a mean
PSS of 37.9 ms, 95% CI (46/30.5) and SD ¼ 63.5
ms, 95% CI (48.3/75.6) indicating that color had to
change before position in order to be considered as
synchronous (see Figure 2). This effect was not affected
by the fact that color change was ﬁxed and position
change variable, PSS ¼ 36.0 ms, 95% CI (47.5/
24.9) or the opposite, PSS ¼ 39.9 ms, 95% CI
(50.6/28.6). The same observation was made relating
to the SD of the function, which was not affected by the
fact that the color change was ﬁxed and position
change occurred 6200 ms around position change SD
¼ 66.4 ms, 95% CI (57.8/75.1) or the opposite SD ¼
60.6 ms, 95% CI (35.3/77.7). Consequently, these
results indicate that time processing for detecting
position change was shorter than time processing for
detecting color change, leading to the perception of
asynchrony when both changes occurred simultaneous-
ly. The direction of this effect was very consistent
across participants (when considering individual PSS
differences between-participants, standard deviation
was 25.07 ms).
Temporal order judgment of color and position change
in the motor condition
When testing the effect of performing a motor action
on the temporal order judgment of color and position
changes, the mean estimated PSS was3.3 ms, 95% CI
(8.9/2.6), and SD ¼ 69.6 ms, 95% CI (60.5/78.3).
Therefore, position change had to occur about 3 ms
after color change for perceiving synchrony. A 95%
conﬁdence interval indicated that this value was not
different from zero, suggesting that the asynchrony
observed in the perceptual condition virtually disap-
peared in the motor condition. As a consequence, the
PSS in the motor condition was signiﬁcantly different
from the PSS in the perceptual condition (as indicated
by the absence of overlap between the 95% conﬁdence
intervals in perceptual and motor conditions, see
Figure 2). The direction of this effect was very
consistent across participants (when considering indi-
vidual PSS differences between-participants, standard
deviation was 19.7 ms).
Considering separately the color ﬁxed block and
position ﬁxed block, we found that the PSS was,
respectively, 3 ms, 95% CI (5.4/10.8) with SD ¼ 66.5
ms, 95% CI (58.2/75.5) and 9.6 ms, 95% CI (18.3/
1.1) with SD ¼ 71.8 ms, 95% CI (57.2/85.9). These
PSSs were signiﬁcantly different from the average PSS
found in the perceptual condition (as indicated by the
95% conﬁdence interval in the perceptual condition).
Considering the 100 ms and þ100 ms blocks
separately, we found that the PSS was, respectively,
8.9 ms, 95% CI (17.4/0.6) with SD¼ 77.4 ms, 95%
CI (57.9/94.7) and 2.3 ms, 95% CI (6.1/10.8) with SD
¼ 62.8 ms, 95% CI (55.4/69.8). These PSSs were also
signiﬁcantly different from the average PSS found in
the perceptual condition (as indicated by the 95% CI [-
46/30.5] in the perceptual condition). Interestingly,
the SD of the distributions of the data in the perceptual
and motor conditions were not statistically different in
the perceptual and motor tasks as shown by the lack of
overlap between the two 95% conﬁdence intervals. This
indicates that the motor action did not make the task
more difﬁcult and is consistent with the fact that
participants judged the same sensory information in the
motor condition as in the perceptual one.
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Temporal order judgment of color and position change
in the tactile condition
When performing the TOJ task between changes of
color and position visual attributes in the presence of
tactile stimulation, participants’ performances revealed
a mean PSS of36 ms, 95% CI (39.9/31.9); with SD
¼ 68.9 ms, 95% CI (63.4/73.9). Therefore, color change
had to occur about 36 ms earlier than position change
in order for the participant to perceive the two changes
simultaneously. Conﬁdence intervals indicated that this
value was signiﬁcantly different from 0 ms but not
signiﬁcantly different from the PSS found in the
perceptual condition, 37.9 ms, 95% CI (46/30.5),
see Figure 2. The direction of this effect was very
consistent across participants (when considering indi-
vidual PSS, between-participants standard deviation
was 13 ms).
When considering separately color ﬁxed block and
position ﬁxed block, we found a PSS of, respectively,
36.1 ms, 95% CI (41.6/30.5); with SD ¼ 63.4 ms,
95% CI (54.4/71.1) and36 ms, 95% CI (42.1/30.3);
with SD ¼ 71.8 ms, 95% CI (66.1/81.6). These PSSs
were not signiﬁcantly different from the average PSS
found in the perceptual condition, as indicated by the
conﬁdence intervals, 95% CI (46/30.5). Considering
the100 ms and þ100 ms blocks separately, we found
that the PSS was, respectively, 32.9 ms, 95% CI
(38.6/27.3); with SD ¼ 71 ms, 95% CI (62.5/78.7)
and 39.1 ms, 95% CI (44.5/33.2); with SD ¼ 66.5
ms, 95% CI (58.5/73.7). These PSSs were also not
signiﬁcantly different from the average PSS found in
the perceptual condition as indicated by the conﬁdence
intervals, 95% CI (46/30.5). Interestingly, the stan-
dard deviations of the distributions in the perceptual,
motor, and tactile conditions were not statistically
different, as revealed by the 95% conﬁdence interval.
This indicates that the tactile stimulation did not make
the task less or more difﬁcult and seems to conﬁrm the
fact that participants have judged the visual informa-
tion similarly in the tactile condition as in the
perceptual and motor conditions. The presence of the
tactile stimulation did not reduce the asynchrony
observed in the perceptual condition, suggesting that
it weakly contributed to the reduction of asynchrony in
the motor task (3.3 ms).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the
effect of performing a manual reaching task on the
temporal order judgments of position and color
changes of a visual target. We tested in particular
whether the perceived relative timing of sensory events
was modiﬁed when timely locked to a self-generated
action compared to a baseline perceptual condition or a
condition where tactile stimulation was provided
around the time visual attributes changed but in the
absence of any intentional motor action. When
perceptually judging the relative change between
position and color attributes of a visual object,
temporal order judgments showed that color change
must precede position change by 37.9 ms in order for
the participant to perceive a simultaneous change of the
two attributes. This ﬁnding is in line with previous
studies that have reported asynchrony in TOJ tasks
when estimating variations of color and position
attributes of a visual stimulus (Pisella, Arzi, & Rossetti,
1998; Tanaka & Shimojo, 1996), suggesting different
integration times of these attributes to form a single
percept. These observed asynchronies could be ac-
counted for by the differential delays characterizing the
visual neural pathways associated with color and
position processing (Nowak & Bullier, 1997). Indeed,
color is thought to be processed within the ventral
stream of the visual system, which received the visual
inputs with a delay of at least 40 ms compared to the
dorsal stream of the visual system responsible for
processing position and movement changes (Nowak &
Bullier, 1997; Tanne´ et al., 1995). Contrary to our
ﬁndings in which color lags change of position, color
has been reported to lead motion in the context of the
CMA (e.g., Nishida & Johnston, 2002). This clear
discrepancy is not easy to reconcile by invoking ventral
and dorsal differences as both position change and
movement direction change are arguably dorsally
processed. Neither can the time marker model pro-
Figure 2. Proportion of position change perceived as the first
change in the temporal order judgment task as a function of SOA,
when comparing position and color change in the motor (plain
line), tactile (dashed grey line), and perceptual (dashed black line)
conditions. For the sake of simplifying graphical presentation, we
normalized the responses and used position change as a time-
marker (zero value).
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posed in Nishida and Johnston (2002) easily accom-
modate our results as both color and position changes
would correspond to ﬁrst-order temporal changes (i.e.,
the change is ascertained by comparing two samples).
However the CMA arises when direction has to be
paired with color. In this context, direction needs
integration time and realizing the direction of a
movement might involve different processing than
ascertaining a change of position. For example, in
hitting movements, direction has been found to be
perceived separately than motion (Brouwer, Middel-
burg, Smeets, & Brenner 2003). Admittedly, we used a
change of position instead of smooth motion. Never-
theless, our change of position could have activated
motion areas just as if it was apparent motion (Maffei,
Macaluso, Indovina, Orban, & Lacquaniti, 2010).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that previous studies
have reported longer asynchrony in the perception of
color and position changes. Pisella et al. (1998), for
instance, found that color information was processed
about 80 ms slower than position information.
However, this result was obtained in a visuo-manual
adaptation task where participants were requested to
prevent from responding when either the color or the
position of the target changed at movement onset. The
task thus evaluated visuo-motor delays as well as
timing of inhibition processes which may explain the
longer asynchrony that we found in our task, which
focused essentially on perceptual processes.
Importantly, the pattern of results in the TOJ task
was different when the participants estimated the
temporal order of color and position changes while
performing a voluntary motor action. In the action
condition, the asynchrony reported above nearly
vanished and simultaneous changes were perceived
when the two changes occurred while separated by only
3.3 ms, a value not statistically different from 0 ms.
Then, self-generated signals, associated with the pro-
duction of a voluntary motor action, seem to have
contributed to the performance in the TOJ task with
the effect of reducing the relative timing between the
perception of position and color changes of visual
objects when occurring near a movement end-point.
This effect cannot be accounted for by tactile feedback
experienced at the movement end-point, since asyn-
chrony between perceived position and color change
was 36 ms in the tactile condition, a value close to the
one observed in the perceptual condition (39.7 ms).
Consequently, tactile information did not seem to play
a crucial role in the perception of relative change of
position and color attributes of a visual target when
executing an intentional motor action. The reduction of
asynchrony between perceived color change and
perceived position change in the motor condition was
then probably more dependent on a motor-related
signals and predictive mechanisms rather than sensory-
related signals resulting from the production of
intentional action. This ﬁnding corroborates the
previous observations that performing a voluntary
action inﬂuences the temporal perception of action
consequences in the environment (Haggard et al., 2002;
Stetson et al., 2006). As a whole, these experiments
have suggested that the perception of sensory events
(e.g., a sound) occurs earlier in time (about 50 ms)
when its occurrence is preceded by a manual reaching
action (Haggard et al., 2002). Furthermore, the
perceptual temporal discrimination threshold when
judging the occurrence of two stimuli increased when
associated with an intentional action (Wenke &
Haggard, 2009). This natural variation of the temporal
relationship between action parameters and action-
related sensory effects was interpreted within the
framework of intentional binding, suggesting that
delays in sensory and motor signals processing are
reduced (Haggard et al., 2002) or recalibrated (Stetson
et al., 2006). However the reduction of delays due to
recalibration cannot explain the reported pattern. We
could initially consider two possibilities: Either the time
processing for color was shortened for the action or
lengthened for position changes. The ﬁrst one, although
a possibility, is more difﬁcult to interpret. However,
position is much more relevant for goal-directed
actions. This could imply that a change of position
requires the visuo-motor system to further update or
remap the new position, while this would not be
mandatory for a color change.
In the following experiment, we tested whether
asynchrony while performing an action also reduces
when performing a TOJ task involving cross-modal
stimuli, i.e., when judging the relative timing between a
visual attribute change and tactile stimulation. In the
context of intentional action, the relation between
visual and tactile information is thought to be less
predictable than the relation between various visual
attributes. Indeed, tactile information in intentional
action does not always vary congruently with visual
information depending on object (soft or rigid) or
action (touching, grasping, pulling, etc.) properties. In
agreement with this, previous studies have shown that
the effect of action on estimation of time intervals
(Morrone, Ross, & Burr, 2005) or sensory recalibration
in temporal order judgment tasks (Fujisaki, Shimojo,
Kashino, & Nishida, 2004; Stetson et al., 2006; Vroo-
men, Keetels, de Gelder, & Bertelson, 2004) is weaker
when involving cross-modal instead of unimodal
sensory information. Furthermore, voluntary action
produces an attenuation of body-related sensory
information (Blakemore et al., 1999) which renders
the processing of tactile information less accurate
(Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003). We then
tested in the following study whether asynchrony in the
temporal order judgment task also reduced while
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performing an action (motor condition) and comparing
cross-modal, i.e., visual and tactile, sensory informa-
tion. In the tactile condition, judgments of relative
timing between a visual attribute change and tactile
stimulation were tested also in a passive condition, i.e.,
with no motor action. In this condition, tactile
stimulations were provided by a loudspeaker as in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 2: Effect of motor
action on perceived relative
timing between position or color
and tactile information
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the reduction of
asynchrony in the TOJ of perceived object-related
attributes while performing an action is still observed
when the TOJ task concerns object-related (color or
position) versus object-unrelated (tactile) information.
The task was to evaluate whether the color (or position)
change or the ﬁnger-target contact occurred ﬁrst and
was performed under active (motor) or passive (tactile)
conditions. In the passive tactile condition, the task was
to evaluate which of the color (or position) change or
the ﬁnger tactile concurrent stimulation occurred ﬁrst,
while performing no motor action.
Procedure and data analysis
The task for the participants was to perform a
temporal order judgment task comparing color or
position attributes change of a visual target with ﬁnger-
target contact at the movement end-point (motor
condition) or with ﬁnger tactile concurrent stimulation
(tactile condition) while remaining still. In the motor
condition, as in Experiment 1, participants positioned
their right index ﬁnger at the starting location on the
screen and an auditory tone was provided between 500
and 1000 ms after the right foreﬁnger reached the
starting location indicating the beginning of the trial.
Following the tone the participants had to manually
reach the target in about 700 ms and one of the target
attributes (color or position) changed within a temporal
window of 6200 ms relative to when ﬁnger-target
contact occurred (see Figure 3). In the tactile condition,
the participant positioned their right foreﬁnger at the
center of the loudspeaker positioned on the computer
screen close to the target location. In each trial, the
beginning of the trial corresponded to the appearance
of the target on the screen and the tactile stimulation
was provided following a delay of 700 ms. One test
target attribute (color or position) changed within a
temporal window of 6200 ms relative to the tactile
stimulation (referent attribute), which was delivered on
the foreﬁnger (see Figure 3). In the motor condition,
the task for the participants was to indicate whether the
visual change (position or color) occurred ﬁrst, or
whether this was the contact of the foreﬁnger with the
target that occurred ﬁrst. Negative SOA were obtained
as in Experiment 1 from the spatial location of the hand
during movement execution. Spatial coordinates on
average corresponding to200 ms,150 ms,100 ms,
and50 ms were, respectively, 60 mm, 45 mm, 30 mm,
and 15 mm from the target location along the vertical z
axis of the computer screen. Assuming that movements
were executed in about 700 ms, expected average
negative SOA between change of test target attribute
and ﬁnger contact was 100 ms (SOA: 200, 150,
100,50, 0 ms). Postexperiment analysis revealed that
averaged SOA before ﬁnger contact was 102.4 (SD:
20.7 ms), this value being not statistically different from
the expected value, t(9) ¼ 0.36, p ¼ 0.73.
In the tactile condition, the task for the participants
was to indicate whether the visual change (position or
color) occurred ﬁrst or whether this was the tactile
stimulation that occurred ﬁrst. Responses were provid-
ed by using one of the two buttons of the response box
(two-AFC paradigm). In each of these conditions
presented in block sessions, the participants performed
90 trials, SOAs (200;150;100;50; 0; 50; 100; 150;
200 ms) · 10 Trials.
In the motor condition (color or position), the set of
data for each participant was the distribution of the
proportion of trials in which the ﬁnger-target contact
was perceived ﬁrst (used as reference for normalized
responses). In the tactile (color or position) conditions,
the set of data for each participant was the distribution
of the proportion of trials in which the ﬁnger tactile
stimulation was perceived ﬁrst (used as reference for
normalized responses). A positive PSS value corre-
sponded to a processing of ﬁnger-target contact or
tactile stimulation lagging the processing of the test
attribute change (position or color) and a negative PSS
value indicated that the processing of ﬁnger-target
contact was faster than the processing of the test
attribute change (position or color). Data analysis was
performed as in Experiment 1.
Result
Temporal order judgment of color or position change
and finger-target contact in the motor condition
In the motor condition, when analyzing temporal
order judgments of color change and ﬁnger-target
contact, we found a PSS of 2.6 ms, 95% CI (10.3/
15.5); with SD ¼ 129.1 ms, 95% CI (114.7/145.3).
Therefore, color must change slightly after ﬁnger-target
contact in order for the participants to consider the two
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events as occurring synchronously. Similarly, position
must change 36.1 ms, 95% CI (22.9/49.2); SD¼136 ms,
95% CI (118.8/156.1) after ﬁnger-target contact in
order for the participants to consider the two events as
occurring synchronously (see Figure 4a). A 95%
conﬁdence interval showed that the PSS was shorter
when estimating color change than when estimating
position change relative to ﬁnger-target contact (the
difference being 33.5 ms). By contrast, a 95%
conﬁdence interval suggested that the SD of the
psychometric functions did not differ, though they
were shallower than in the perceptual, tactile, and
motor conditions of Experiment 1, respectively, 95%
CI (48.3/75.6), 95% CI (63.4/73.9), and 95% CI (60.5/
78.3).
Temporal order judgment of color or position change
and finger-tactile stimulation in the tactile condition
In the tactile condition, when analyzing temporal
order judgments of color change and ﬁnger-tactile
stimulation, we found a PSS of 36.2 ms, 95% CI
(48.3/23.8); with SD ¼ 124.1 ms, 95% CI (109.8/
139.8). Therefore, color must change signiﬁcantly
before ﬁnger-tactile stimulation in order for the
participants to consider the two events as occurring
synchronously. Position must change8.4 ms, 95% CI
(21/3.6); with SD ¼ 136 ms, 95% CI (110.5/138.8)
before ﬁnger-tactile stimulation in order for the
participants to consider the two events as occurring
synchronously (see Figure 4b). A 95% conﬁdence
interval showed that the PSS was shorter when
estimating position change than when estimating color
change relative to ﬁnger-tactile stimulation (the differ-
ence being 27.8 ms). By contrast, a 95% conﬁdence
interval suggested that the SDs of the psychometric
functions did not differ, though they were shallower
than in the perceptual, tactile, and motor condition of
Experiment 1, respectively, 95% CI (48.3/75.6), 95%
CI (63.4/73.9), and 95% CI (60.5/78.3).
The fact that in this experiment the SDs of the
psychophysics functions were shallower in the motor
and tactile conditions than in the perceptual, motor, and
tactile conditions of Experiment 1 was indeed expected if
participants were making intersensory judgements, as
required by the task, when compared to unimodal TOJ
judgements (see Miyazaki, Yamamoto, Uchida, &
Kitazawa, 2006). Therefore, this is consistent with
participants comparing cross-modal information.
Discussion
In this study, we tested whether asynchrony in a
temporal order judgment task, as observed in the
perceptual condition of Experiment 1, also reduced
while performing an action in the context of a cross-
modal TOJ task, i.e., when judging temporal order of
visual (color or position) and tactile stimuli. We found
that the asynchrony between perceived color change
Figure 3. Time sequence of test attribute (color or position) change according to finger-target contact with the screen or tactile stimulation
(reference attribute). The change of test attribute could occur within the time window of 6200 ms according to the finger-target contact
with the screen or tactile stimulation.
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and tactile information (2.6 ms) was different from the
asynchrony between perceived position change and
tactile information (36.1 ms). The difference between
these two values (33.5 ms) was close to the one
observed in the perceptual task of Experiment 1 (39.7
ms). Thus, despite the fact that visual and tactile stimuli
were associated with the execution of an intentional
action, no reduction in relative timing processing of
sensory events was observed. The absence of any
reduction in asynchrony due to action in cross-modal
TOJ was conﬁrmed by the results obtained in the tactile
condition of Experiment 2, where TOJ of visual
attribute change (color or position) and tactile stimuli
was performed. In this condition, asynchrony between
perceived color change and tactile information (36.2
ms) was different from the asynchrony between
perceived position change and tactile information
(8.4 ms). The difference between these two values
(27.8 ms) was again close to the one observed in the
perceptual task of Experiment 1 (39.7 ms) and also to
the one observed in the motor condition of Experiment
2 (33.5 ms). Then, although the sensory changes due to
intentional action can be anticipated in the action
condition, asynchrony between visual and tactile
information was not less than in the perceptual
condition (Experiment 1), suggesting that executing
an intentional action did not modify the perception of a
temporal relationship of cross-modal sensory signals.
However, the motor and tactile conditions revealed
that tactile information was processed about 40 ms
slower when associated with an intentional action,
which made the time processing for tactile information
closer to the time required for processing color
information, though this did not modify the relative
time of processing color and position attributes. The
increase of time processing for tactile information
might be the consequence of the sensory attenuation
effects associated with intentional action (Blakemore et
al., 1999), which would render tactile information
processing more difﬁcult resulting in an increase in
time processing
One explanation for the lack of effect of voluntary
action on cross-modal sensory perception might be that
tactile information plays little role as a time marker in
processing visual consequences of acting. Another
interpretation could be that the highly variable tactile
information depending on the execution context makes
the perception of the time correspondence between
visual and tactile information difﬁcult in natural
conditions and thus the elaboration of predicting
mechanisms. In agreement with this, the standard
deviations of the data used to compute the cumulative
Gaussian functions were larger in the cross-modal
condition compared to the unimodal condition, making
the slopes of the ﬁtted function shallower and
suggesting then that the former condition was percep-
tually more difﬁcult.
General discussion
To summarize, when considered together the present
data showed that intentional action can modify how we
perceive external events that occur temporally in the
vicinity of action end-point. Indeed, when passively
Figure 4. (A) Proportion of finger-target contact perceived as the first change in the temporal order judgment task as a function of SOA,
when comparing finger-target contact to position (plain line) or color (dashed line) visual change. For the sake of graphical presentation,
we normalized the responses and used finger-target contact as a reference (zero value). (B) Proportion of tactile stimulation perceived as
the first change in the temporal order judgment task as a function of the SOA, when comparing tactile stimulation to position (plain line) or
color (dashed line) visual change. For the sake of simplifying graphical presentation, we normalized the responses and used tactile
stimulation as a time-marker (zero value).
Journal of Vision (2012) 12(11):20, 1–16 Corveleyn, Lo´pez-Moliner, & Coello 11
observing a visual stimulus, change of its position was
perceived 37.9 ms earlier than change of its color. This
ﬁnding is in line with previous studies that have
reported asynchrony in temporal order judgment tasks
of color and position attributes of a visual target
(Pisella, Arzi, & Rossetti, 1998; Tanaka & Shimojo,
1996), suggesting different processing times of these
different attributes to form a single percept. At the
same time, it challenges recent models that attempt to
account for the CMA (e.g., Nishida & Johnston, 2002)
by invoking the impossibility of pairing ﬁrst (color
change) and second-order (e.g., direction) changes
which would lead to perceive changes of direction as
lagging the changes of color. Unlike what is usually the
case in this illusion, we have found that color lags the
change of position, with both changes arguably being
ﬁrst-order changes. When perceiving these very same
visual changes while performing an intentional action,
the latter had the effect of broadly reducing this
asynchrony. Indeed, when changing the color and
position of a visual target at the vicinity of a reaching
movement end-point, the relative timing to obtain the
perception of simultaneous change was close to 0 ms
(Experiment 1, motor condition). This effect was not
due to the presence of a concurrent tactile stimulation
(Experiment 1, tactile condition), since the mere
presence of a tactile stimulation at the time the
temporal order judgment of color and position were
performed, in the absence of intentional action, was not
sufﬁcient to reduce the asynchrony observed in the
perceptual condition. The positive effect of performing
a motor action on perceptual judgments conﬁrms
previous studies that have revealed an effect of
intentional action on temporal perception of motor
and sensory events, so that timing errors between
sensory information are reduced (Lo´pez-Moliner &
Linares, 2006) or a perceptual event is shifted earlier in
time towards the action that is supposed to have caused
it (Haggard, 2005; Haggard et al., 2002). In the same
vein, it has been demonstrated that temporal sensory
discrimination threshold increases when associated
with an intentional action (Wenke & Haggard, 2009).
The lack of effect of tactile information on temporal
order judgment of visual events is also compatible with
the previous observation that imposing a movement
kinematically identical to a self-initiated action did not
induce intentional binding (Engbert, Wohlschla¨ger, &
Haggard, 2008; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard,
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Wohlschla¨ger, Engbert, &
Haggard, 2003). Thus, the effect of action on temporal
order judgment seems intrinsically dependent on
voluntary action and not effector kinematics or
somatosensory feedback (Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo,
2011).
One possible interpretation for these effects of action
on sensorimotor processing is that action modiﬁes how
attentional processes are allocated to the target
(Roskies, 1999; Whitney, 2009) with a direct conse-
quence on how sensory information is processed and
integrated (Holcombe & Cavanagh, 2008; Posner &
Dehaene, 1994; Treisman, 1999; Treisman & Gelade,
1980; Wolfe & Cave, 1999). This is indeed what
suggests the premotor theory of visual perception,
which considers that (eye or manual) action planning
towards a visual target and orientation of attention
towards that target represent a unique process improv-
ing visual perception on target’s properties (Deubel &
Schneider, 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 1998). In line
with this interpretation, Holcombe and Cavanagh
(2008) found that perceived asynchrony between
change in color and change in motion direction of a
visual dot reduced when changes were synchronized
with the presentation of an external cue. One may thus
consider the possibility that that the ﬁnger approaching
the target in the motor condition played as an
exogenous cue affecting the perception of the relative
timing between color and position changes. However,
assuming that the position of the ﬁnger played as an
exogenous cue, one would have also expected an effect
of the ﬁnger position on the perception of the relative
timing between visual attribute and tactile information,
or even in the passive condition, which was not
observed. Furthermore, the fact that the standard
deviation of the data estimated from the cumulative
Gaussian in the perceptual, tactile and motor condi-
tions (Experiment 1) were equivalent argue against a
pure attentional effect, since this indicates that per-
forming an action toward a visual target did not modify
the sensitivity of the visual system when processing the
target’s properties. Finally, studies on intentional
binding have suggested that the change in time
processing of a sensory event when associated with
intentional action does not depend exclusively on
attentional mechanisms, since when participants were
prevented from focusing on a particular event, they
show a very strong binding effect even for this event,
which did not receive speciﬁc attention (Haggard &
Cole, 2007).
An alternative explanation can be proposed, which
considers that the effect of voluntary action on
temporal order judgment of sensory events emerged
from a speciﬁc neural mechanism producing intentional
binding of actions and their effects in conscious
awareness (Aymoz & Viviani, 2004; Haggard et al.,
2002). This mechanism can be related to the fact that
‘‘events surrounding voluntary action are bound by a
speciﬁc cognitive function of the central nervous
system’’ (Haggard et al., 2002) or that ‘‘the temporal
interval between action and consequences is perceived
as shorter because the consequence of the action is
anticipated and therefore processed faster’’ (Baldo et
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al., 2007). Prediction mechanisms are thus thought to
constrain visual perception in relation to action by
taking into account the internal delays associated with
the processing of different sensory information and
timely synchronized according to the prediction made
by the motor system (Stetson et al., 2006). In agreement
with this, previous studies have shown that object-
attributes binding is intrinsically related to voluntary
action and occurs mainly when a temporal contiguity
exists between an action and its effect (Cravo,
Claessens, & Baldo, 2011; Engbert, Wohlschla¨ger, &
Haggard, 2008; Haggard et al., 2002; Wohlschla¨ger,
Engbert, & Haggard, 2003). In these studies, the
authors revealed that voluntary action produces a
contraction of time by which the perception of an
action initiation and its consequences are temporally
attracted towards each other (intentional binding).
Buehner and Humphreys (2009) have further suggested
that a causality relationship between action and
sensory consequences is necessary for the intentional
binding effect to occur. In line with this, Desantis,
Roussel, and Waszak (2011) recently showed that
having the belief of being responsible for sensory effect
as a consequence of action increases the degree of
intentional binding. In the same vein, Engbert,
Wohlschla¨ger, and Haggard (2008) showed that tem-
poral binding not only relates movements with the
effects they actually produce but also with effects they
are expected to produce.
Though the present study focused on perceived
relative timing between sensory changes, the intentional
binding framework can quite effectively account for
our data since we found that asynchrony between color
and position changes when presented simultaneously
reduced substantially when the visual events occur near
the end of a reaching action. Whether action modiﬁes
(or recalibrates) the processing delay associated with
each sensory attribute or the time window within which
attributes changes are considered as simultaneous, or
even shifts the whole sensory processing in time, are
alternative interpretations for the effect of action in
perceived relative timing of visual attributes, which
remain to be more carefully investigated in the future
(see however Wenke & Haggard, 2009). Whatever the
nature of the effect of interacting physically with the
target, the present data revealed, for the ﬁrst time, that
endogenous signals associated with the planning and
execution of an intentional motor action and expected
sensory consequences improve the perception of visual
objects attributes changes.
The facilitating effect of producing an intentional
action seems weakened, however, when considering
cross-modal information. Indeed, asynchrony between
color and ﬁnger-target contact and between position
and ﬁnger-target contact showed a difference of 33.5
ms, a value close to the asynchrony observed in the
perceptual condition (37.9 ms). The same asynchrony
was observed when performing the TOJ task in the
absence of intentional action (27.7 ms). Though this
remains to be properly investigated, a possible inter-
pretation for this lack of asynchrony reduction in the
cross-modal condition could be the absence of consis-
tent time correspondence between visual and tactile
sensory variation during intentional action, which
might prevent the elaboration of reliable predicting
mechanisms. This would explain why the asynchrony
was reduced by an intentional action when comparing
two pieces of object-related information instead of one
piece of object-related and one of object-unrelated
information. An alternative interpretation could be
related to the sensory attenuation effect that has been
reported for tactile information processing in the
context of intentional action. Blakemore et al. (1999)
reported indeed that self-produced tactile stimulation is
generally perceived with a weaker intensity than when
produced by an external cause. This attenuation effect
is thought to facilitate the distinction between self- and
externally generated sensory signals leading to the sense
of agency (Bays, Flanagan, & Wolpert, 2005; Bays,
Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2006). In the present study, a
sensory tactile attenuation phenomenon may thus
explain the lack of action effect on perceptual
asynchrony between tactile and visual information.
In conclusion, the present study provides new insight
into the effect of performing a voluntary action onto
the perception of action consequences. In particular, we
found that temporal constraints associated with the
integration of sensory information of visual attributes
are reduced when performing a reaching action
compared to a simple perceptual task. Our results
suggest then that the facilitation effect gained from
performing an actual motor action on visual attributes
processing seems to rely on the predictions carried by
the internal signals associated with self-generated
action and not cross-modal sensory calibration pro-
cesses. It remains to test whether these effects can be
generalized to other object-related attributes. Further-
more, testing temporal order judgments of visual
attributes changes but with various time delays between
action ending and sensory effects would represent a
relevant paradigm for probing agency.
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